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Abstract
Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking
industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminated with the Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic
consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Some expressed
concern about the long-term health of the smaller community banks. This paper
describes and discusses the actual evolution of the U.S. banking industry over the
past two decades, using the 1976 to 1998 Report of Condition and Income (Call
Report) and merger data recently posted on the web site of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. Among several results, more permissive interstate banking and
branching regulation significantly associates with higher merger rates, with lower
net entry rates, and with higher concentration within states. Interestingly, more
permissive intrastate banking and branching regulation only associates with higher
concentration.
Keywords: commercial banks, regulation, structure
 I. Introduction 
The twentieth century witnessed two periods of dramatic regulatory and structural change in the 
U.S. banking industry – the Great Depression and the various events of the 1980s and 1990s.1 
While important regulations were enacted during the Great Depression, the 1980s and 1990s 
experienced the repeal and/or reversal of most of those depression-era financial regulations. 
Moreover, those two decades saw the transformation of the banking industry from one with 
extensive geographic limitations on banking and branching to one now characterized by 
interstate banking and branching. 
 The deregulation of first intrastate and then interstate banking and branching activities 
undoubtedly played a major role in the changing structure of the U.S. commercial banking 
industry. Our analysis follows two different, but complementary, paths – descriptive analysis 
that traces the trends in the changing structure of commercial banking and more formal analysis 
that considers the effects, if any, of deregulation on mergers, concentration, and net entries on a 
state-by-state basis. 
 The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago recently posted on its web site the Report of 
Condition and Income (Call Report) and merger data for the period 1976 to 1998. That important 
source of data is now freely available to all interested parties. In the past, such data were only 
available at some real dollar cost to individual researchers. We employ those data to provide a 
panorama of structural change occurring over that period. Our description presents geographic 
patterns of change, largely on a state-by-state, and occasionally on a city-by-city, basis. 2 Those 
                                                 
1 That statement ignores, of course, the events leading up to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
2 Rhodes (2000) discusses similar issues using not publicly available data. The data at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago web site (http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/bhcdatabase.cfm) 
significantly levels the research playing field between those inside and outside the Federal Reserve System.  
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 data also provide the inputs for our more formal, econometric analysis that uses panel data to 
perform fixed- and random-effects estimation. 
 The presentation in the paper unfolds as follows. Section II provides an overview of 
regulatory and structural change, and Section III considers merger activity of banks by state. 
Section IV examines concentration in banking at the national and state levels. Section V explores 
the movement of the largest banks, in terms of assets, by state and city, while Section VI 
discusses the entry and exit of banks over the sample period by state. Section VII concludes the 
analysis. 
II. Regulatory and Structural Change: An Overview3 
Because of our forefathers concern about concentrations of power, the U.S. banking industry 
possesses many more independent institutions than is the norm in the rest of the world.4 The 
regulatory environment within which the U.S. commercial banking industry operates changed 
notably in the last twenty years, including, but not limited to, the Depository Institution 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Depository Institution Act of 1982, and the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  
 Early in U.S. banking history, commercial banks received their charters from individual 
states and could not operate across state boundaries. The passage of the National Banking Act of 
1864 established the chartering of national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency, but this 
                                                 
3 Our brief historical discussion of banking regulation relies heavily on the more lengthy discussions in Kane (1996) 
and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  
4 At the other extreme, Canada currently has 8 domestic banks and 43 foreign banks. The domestic banks 
experienced a recent fall from 11 to 8 with the loss of the three smallest banks. Although relatively large in number, 
foreign banks held just over 1 percent of total Canadian bank assets at the end of 1998. Information on the number 
and size of banking operations comes from the web site of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/AndreE/Index.htm. The U.S., on the other hand, had 9,389 banks at the end of 1998. 
The U.S. banking data, unless otherwise noted, comes from the Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) data 
from 1976 through 1998 that is posted on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. U.S. bank numbers, 
unless otherwise noted, include mutual saving banks and non-deposit trust companies, banks in U.S. territories, as 
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 legislation, although silent on the issue of branching by the national banks, was interpreted to 
conform to existing prohibitions against branching across state borders. The McFadden Act of 
1927 and the Banking Act of 1933 generally prohibited branching across state lines.  
 That legal landscape, however, possessed its loopholes. First, seven bank holding 
companies already operated across state lines when the McFadden Act was enacted. Those 
institutions’ operations were grandfathered. But second, and more important, bank holding 
companies could acquire banks across state lines, if such actions were explicitly permitted by the 
states involved. That second loophole was first mined in 1975 when Maine adopted legislation 
permitting out-of-state holding companies to acquire Maine banks, if reciprocity existed in the 
other state. But substantial movement did not really begin until 1982 when New York also 
passed reciprocity legislation and Massachusetts passed similar legislation restricted to the New 
England states. The overture by New York led to a patchwork of regional reciprocity pacts that 
emerged over the next few years. Most states participated in one or more regional pacts with 
California, New York, and Texas as notable exceptions (exclusions). Although banks were 
allowed to acquire failed thrift institutions across state lines as a result of the savings and loan 
crisis, the bulk of bank mergers across state lines preceded through bank holding companies. 
Finally, and most recently, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
permitted bank acquisitions in other states.5 State legislation has generally liberalized its rules on 
branch banking within states’ borders.6 Legislative activity has gradually reduced the number of 
states to a very few that have either unit or limited branching. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
well as domestic and foreign banks. 
5 States could opt out of this legislation, if they so chose. To date, only Texas and Montana have opted out of 
interstate banking and branching. 
6 Historically, states were divided into three groups: (i) those states that allowed statewide branching with few 
restrictions, (ii) those states that allowed limited statewide branching with numerous restrictions, and (iii) those 
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  Branching and merger restrictions were originally promulgated to prevent banking 
institutions from monopolizing credit markets. That same legislation, ironically, granted local 
monopoly power to smaller community banks. Thus, the relaxation of restrictions on interstate 
and intrastate banking and branching may lead to wholesale or large-scale acquisition of small 
community banks. An important policy concern associated with such a prospect is the supply of 
credit to small businesses, which many see as one of the real engines of future growth. 
 A few authors forecast the future structure of the U.S. banking industry. Those analysts 
see a two-tiered system with a group of megabanks that participate in national and global credit 
markets and a much larger number of community banks that participate in local credit markets. 
For example, Miller (1988) forecasts just over 2,000 banks in a fully operating interstate banking 
and branching system.7 More recently, Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) provide a long-run 
forecast of between 2,000 to 4,000 banks under interstate banking and branching.8 Moreover, 
they forecast that the decrease in organizations should occur largely within five years. Our actual 
count of banks (not organizations) at the end of 1994 equals 11,698 (see Table 1). This count 
falls to 9,839 in 1998, or 84 percent of the 1994 level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
states that allowed only unit banking with essentially no branching activity (see Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas 
1994). 
7 Miller (1988) estimates a regression model that explains the number of banks and offices in each state, depending 
on branching restrictions, and state demographic and geographic information. He then substitutes the national data 
for the demographic and geographic information with the statewide (i.e., nationwide) branching dummy variable 
turned on to generate forecasts of the number of banks and offices under full interstate banking and branching. 
Miller (1988, fn. 9) also uses the existing distribution of banks in California, a state with statewide branching rules, 
to calculate what the distribution of banks assets would look like under interstate banking and branching. He 
estimates that 49 of the 2,017 banks in the interstate banking and branching equilibrium would hold $1,551 billion 
in assets for an average size of $31 billion. 
8 Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) estimate the asset-size distribution in each state as a function of demographic 
and geographic variables, using a pooled cross-section, time-series data set. Moreover, they allow for lagged 
adjustment to the implementation of interstate banking and branching. They also employ the distribution of 
California banks to forecast the distribution of banks under interstate banking and branching. Hannan and Rhoades 
(1992) use California to forecast the number of banks under interstate banking and branching at around 3,500 
organizations in 2010. 
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  Those last observations suggest that the consolidation in the banking industry may be 
proceeding more slowly than Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) projected. The growth of de 
novo banks, and “new” banks by conversion and relocation explains the slower rate of 
consolidation. Between 1976 and 1998, the merger data at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
web site record 11,055 bank mergers (see Table 1). The number of banks did not fall from 
15,264 to 4,209, but rather ended 1998 at 9,839. Over that same period, the merger data record 
6,679 new banks – de novo, conversions, and relocations.  
 What explains the large number of new bank entries? Several recent papers (Berger, 
Bonime, Goldberg, and White 1999, Keeton 2000, Seelig and Critchfield 1999, and Jeon and 
Miller 2001a) consider that question, examining the hypothesis that new bank entries fill a void 
(market niche) left by bank mergers. That is, new entries provide services to small businesses 
and other bank customers formerly provided by banks that have now merged into larger 
organizations.9 That conventional wisdom implies that bank mergers lead to new entries. Seelig 
and Critchfield (1999) challenge conventional wisdom with their empirical findings that mergers 
only dissuade entry. Berger, Bomine, Goldberg, and White (1999) support conventional wisdom 
with their empirical results. More recently, Keeton (2000) criticizes the methods of the prior two 
papers and offers an improved method, finding support for the mergers-imply-new-entries 
hypothesis. Moreover, Keeton (2000) concludes that “… new bank formations may offset some 
of the harmful effects of mergers, making it more likely that banking consolidation is beneficial 
on balance.” (p. 35). Most recently, Jeon and Miller (2001a) consider a number of issues related 
                                                 
9 Keeton (2000) uses that cause-and-effect argument. An alternative hypothesis views increased merger activity as a 
signal that bank charters go at a premium. Thus, new entries acquire a bank charter solely to have it acquired by 
another bank through merger. 
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 to new charters, failures, and mergers. They also support the mergers-imply-new-entries 
hypothesis. 
III. Trends in Merger Activity 
Merger activity in the U.S. banking industry over the past two decades was initially led by bank 
holding company acquisitions. In states with restrictions on branching, bank holding companies 
acquired banks (offices) in locations that circumvented the branching restrictions imposed on an 
individual bank. More recently, the state legislation allowing bank holding company acquisitions 
across state boundaries has facilitated such acquisitions. Most recently, the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Act of 1994 opened the door in nearly all states to regular bank mergers across 
state boundaries.  
Intrastate and Interstate Merger Activity 
Table 1 presents information on commercial bank mergers.10 Several general observations 
emerge. First, bank mergers as a percentage of the total number of banks has trended upward 
over time reaching 6.6 percent in 1997 and 1998. Bank merger activity between states was 
limited to takeover of failed institutions until the implementation of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994 that went into full effect in July 1996. The between-state merger 
percentage of the total merger activity jumped from just over 2 percent prior to 1995 to 6 percent 
in 1995 to 10 percent in 1996 and to 30 percent in 1997 and 1998. Thus, this new legislation has 
affected between-state merger activity. Nonetheless, we note that intrastate mergers still capture 
a wide majority of the activity. 
                                                 
10 See the merger data file for commercial banks posted at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site. The 
merger file contains information that can be used to identify all bank acquisitions and mergers that have occurred 
from 1976 to 1998. 
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  Second, the banking problems first experienced in the mid 1980s, due in large part to 
agricultural and energy-related loans, and ending in early 1990s are reflected in the number of 
mergers involving government assistance.11 The peak years were 1988, 1989 and 1990 when a 
total of 649 bank mergers received government assistance, representing just over 31 percent of 
the total bank mergers in that period. The initial increase occurred in 1982 and the problems did 
not end until 1995.  
Charter Type of Merger Survivors and Non-Survivors 
The merger data file also allows a classification of the charter (bank) type for both merger 
survivors and non-survivors. Charter (bank) types include the following classes: mutual savings 
banks and federal mutual savings banks, national banks, state banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System, state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, non-
deposit trust companies that are members of the Federal Reserve System, and non-deposit trust 
companies that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.12 
 Table 2 reports the charter status for merger survivors and non-survivors. Consider, for 
example, the column headed by NAT. This column reports the survivors of mergers that are 
national banks. Here 5,485 mergers resulted in a survivor who had a national charter. Of this 
total, 211 non-survivors were mutual savings banks, 2,743 were national banks, 378 were state 
banks who were members of the Federal Reserve System, 2,073 were state banks who were not 
members of the Federal Reserve System, and so on.  
                                                 
11 More specifically, Illinois experienced a number of bank failures in the early 1980s. Then Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming followed 
with numerous failures in the mid to late 1980s. Finally, more than 60 percent of the states then saw unusual 
numbers of failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
12 National banks are automatically members of the Federal Reserve System; mutual savings banks, state banks, and 
non-deposit trust companies may or may not be members of the Federal Reserve System. 
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  Now, consider the row for national banks. Here, 3,934 national banks merged and did not 
survive. Of this total, 19 were merged with a surviving mutual saving bank, 2,743 merged with a 
surviving national bank, 312 merged with a surviving state member bank, 858 merged with a 
surviving state non-member bank, and so on. 
 Several observations emerge. First, a substantial number of the survivors, 54 percent, 
have the same charter as the non-survivor, an intra-charter merger. The 54 percent comes from 
adding the diagonal elements in Table 2 and dividing by 11,055, the total number of mergers. As 
a consequence, 46 percent of the mergers are inter-charter mergers. Second, except for state 
member banks, more than 50 percent of the mergers were intra-charter type with mutual saving 
banks having the highest percentage of 75.8 percent followed by non-member state banks at 66.5 
percent. State member banks had intra-charter mergers of only 24.5 percent. Finally, some 
charter types grow, since they have more survivors than non-survivors – national banks (almost 
40 percent more survivors) and state member banks (almost 30 percent more survivors).13 On the 
other hand, twice as many mutual savings banks disappear in mergers as survive and more than 
30 percent more non-member state banks disappear in mergers as survive.  
Merger Activity by State 
Table 3 reports and Figure 1 shows the merger activity by state in three categories – mergers of 
banks within the state, mergers where an out-of-state bank took over an in-state bank, and 
mergers where an in-state bank took over an out-of-state bank. Moreover, Table 3 sorts the states 
by the average number of banks over the sample period. Thus, Texas leads with the highest 
average number of banks; Alaska holds the rear with the lowest. Not surprisingly, the number of 
                                                 
13 Many of the regulatory reforms instituted in the 1980s have reduced the cost of membership in the Federal 
Reserve System. Consistent with those cost reductions, national banks and state member banks grew as a result of 
merger activity, whereas the other categories declined. 
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 mergers in a state generally rises with the number of banks in that state. But that relationship is 
far from perfect. The map in Figure 1 reports the total number of mergers over the entire sample 
period and shades the states depending on ranges for the total number of mergers. The size of the 
pie chart in each state measures the total number of between-state mergers and identifies the 
fractions of those between state mergers where the surviving bank was in state or out of state. 
 Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Texas each experienced more than 400 mergers 
over the sample period. On a percentage basis, those states that experienced a relatively high 
level of merger activity within their borders include Arizona, Florida, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Utah, and Virginia, each of which averaged mergers per year over the entire sample 
period of more than 5 percent. 
 Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, and Missouri led the list in states where out-of-state banks 
took over banks within their borders at 39, 53, 41, and 38 such mergers, respectively. Using 
percentages, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Idaho, and Nevada have relatively large 
numbers of mergers where the surviving banks is out-of-state, each averaging mergers per year 
over the sample period of more than 1 percent. 
 Reversing the focus, Alabama, North Carolina, Ohio, and California banks took over 
more out-of-state banks with 92, 95, 59, and 42 such mergers, respectively. Using percentages, 
Alabama, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Oregon have relatively large numbers of 
mergers where the surviving banks are in state, each averaging more than 1 percent per year. 
North Carolina surpasses every other state with 4.59 percent mergers per year with out-of-state 
banks. 
 The total number of bank mergers between different states is given in Table 1 as 614, 
where, as noted above, a large majority of these interstate mergers occurred since 1996. Thus, 
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 the number of mergers reported in Table 3 where an out-of-state bank took over an in-state bank 
and where an in-state bank took over an out-of-state bank both sum to 614, as they should. The 
distribution of interstate mergers, however, is more diffused for out-of-state banks taking over 
in-state banks (i.e., the standard deviation is 20.0). Conversely, the distribution of interstate 
mergers is more concentrated for in-state banks taking over out-of-state banks (i.e., the standard 
deviation is 11.5). In other words, the survivors of interstate mergers are not surprisingly 
concentrated in fewer states that the non-survivors. 
Deregulation and Merger Activity 
We now consider how deregulation affected merger activity for panel-data regressions using 
fixed- and random-effects techniques. The dependent variable for each regression is the ratio of 
the number of mergers in each state divided by the total number of banks in the corresponding 
state -- the merger rate.  
 Deregulation includes two differing effects – the relaxation of restrictions on (i) intrastate 
and (ii) interstate branching and banking. Most banking researchers employ dummy variables to 
distinguish between states with different intrastate branching and banking regulations – typically 
unit, limited, and state-wide branching and banking states. We employ the average number of 
branches per bank (bch/bn) in each state to capture the actual effect of intrastate branching and 
banking regulation.14 We also employ three dummy variables to capture a state’s regulatory 
stance vis-à-vis interstate operation of bank holding companies. The first (dr) equals one for 
states that enacted legislation that allows out-of-state bank holding companies from a proscribed 
region to operate within the state’s boundaries – either with or without reciprocity from the home 
state of that bank holding company. Otherwise, dr equals zero. The second (dnr) equals one for 
                                                 
14 Jeon and Miller (2001a) provide more discussion of using the number of branches per bank to capture intrastate 
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 states that enacted legislation that allows out-of-state bank holding companies irrespective of 
their headquarters’ locations to operate within the state’s boundaries, but only if the state where 
their headquarters are located have similar (reciprocal) legislation. Otherwise, dnr equals zero. 
The third (dnn) equals one for states that enacted legislation that allow out-of-state bank holding 
companies irrespective of their headquarters’ locations to operate within those states’ boundaries 
without any requirement for reciprocity from the other state. Otherwise, dnn equals zero. Finally, 
we employ the unemployment rate (unem) in each state to control for the business cycle. 
 Table 4 reports the findings for the fixed- and random-effects regressions on bank 
mergers and deregulation. The intrastate branching and banking control variable (bch/bn) proves 
insignificant. Each of the interstate branching and banking dummy variables emerges as 
significantly positive. Thus, more permissive interstate branching and banking regulation states 
experience higher rates of merger activity. Moreover, the economic condition in each state 
(unem) does not significantly affect the merger rate. Interestingly, the deregulation of the 
interstate operations of bank holding companies had significant effects on merger activity while 
the intrastate banking and branching variable did not. We comment further on that observation in 
the conclusion. 
IV. Concentration in Commercial Banking  
This section examines concentration in commercial banking, first at the national level and then 
on a state-by-state basis.15 We first present the magnitude of megabank size over our sample 
period. In 1976, the largest bank holds assets of $73.0 billion. By 1998, the largest bank holds 
$317.1 billion, a 6.9 percent annual geometric growth rate.16 But the growth process is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
branching and banking regulation. 
15 The data here include both domestic and foreign banks. 
16 While we refer to the largest or 10th largest bank between different years, it may not be the same bank. 
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 smooth. Between 1976 and 1988, the largest bank grows to $150.2 billion, a 6.2 percent annual 
growth rate. The largest bank grows by 2.2 percent annually between 1988 and 1992, and by 
11.6 percent annually between 1992 and 1998. A similar pattern of growth occurs for the 10th, 
50th, and 100th largest banks, moving from $16.2, $2.8, and $1.4 billion in assets in 1976 to 
$74.4, $22.8, and $9.9 billion in assets in 1998, or 7.2-, 10.0-, and 9.3-percent annual growth 
rates. While the 50th and 100th largest banks experience slower annual growth of 3.9 and 4.6 
percent between 1988 and 1992, the 10th largest bank declines in size from $35.2 to 32.3 billion, 
or –2.1-percent annual growth. Finally, while the 10th and 50th largest banks resume double-digit 
annual growth of 14.9 and 11.4 percent between 1992 and 1998, the 100th largest bank only 
experiences 5.2 percent annual growth. 
 Table 5 reports the percentages of total bank assets that the top-5, -10, -20, -50, and -100 
banks hold in each year from 1976 through 1998.17 An interesting pattern emerges in that all 
categories depict U-shapes over time. The top-5, -10, -20, -50, and -100 banks hold higher 
percentages in 1976 than in 1991. Further, the percentage in 1998 exceeds that in 1976 for each 
category. For example, the top 100 banks hold 47 percent of all bank assets in 1976. This 
percentage remains at 47 percent through 1981 and then falls slowly to 43 percent in 1990 and 
1991. Since then, the percentages increase slowly to 49 percent in 1995 and then more quickly to 
62 percent in 1998.18 Similar patterns exist for the top-5, -10, -20, and -50 banks as well. 
                                                 
17 Rhodes (2000) using a different data source also provides information on the top 100 banking organizations, 
where all banks in a bank holding company are treated as an organization. In our data, such banks are treated as 
distinct. 
18 Rhodes (2000) reports the concentration in bank deposits rather than assets for the top 100 organizations at 47, 
61, 66, and 71 percent in 1980, 1990, 1994, and 1998, respectively. Our concentration of assets for the top 100 
banks (not organizations) is 47, 43, 48, and 62 percent, respectively. Thus, using organizations paints a picture of 
more concentration. An important issue is whether decision-making authority resides more at the bank holding 
company or individual bank level. 
 13
  While the concentration of banking at the national level is interesting, concentration on a 
state-by-state basis also provides useful information.19 We calculate the percent of total assets 
held by the top-5 and top-10 banks in each state. The average concentration across all states 
hovers around 45 percent for the top-5 banks from 1976 to 1983. It then rises gradually to 50 
percent in 1990 and then 62 percent in 1998. For the top-10 banks, the average concentration 
hovers around 56 percent from 1976 to 1983. It then rises gradually to 61 percent in 1990 and to 
71 percent in 1998. In sum, state-level concentration began rising in 1983 and continued through 
1998. 
 Table 6 reports the ranking of the states in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998 from lowest 
concentration to highest. The median states in each respective year include Mississippi (36.2), 
Pennsylvania (40.3), Connecticut (46.8), Massachusetts (53.3), and New Jersey (63.1).20 The 
median lies below the mean in 1978 (44.9), 1983 (45.6), 1988 (49.1), and 1993 (53.9) and lies 
above the median in only 1998 (61.6). 
 While the rankings possess some stability, movement does occur in the rankings. The 
correlation between the rankings in 1978 and 1983 is 0.96; between 1983 and 1988, 0.90; 
between 1988 and 1993, 0.93; and between 1993 and 1998, 0.82. Thus, the most movement 
occurred over the last five years. Moreover, the longer the time between observations the lower 
the correlation. For example, the correlation between the rankings in 1978 and 1998 is 0.63. In 
addition, we calculated the average ranking and its standard deviation for each state over the 
1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998 observations. For example, Illinois ranked 22, on average, 
                                                 
19 Rhodes (2000) provides information on concentration at the MSA and non-MSA county level. He does not report 
concentration information at the state level. 
20 The numbers in parentheses are the percentage of assets held by the top-5 banks in the state. Similar information 
is available for the top-10 bank concentration ratio from the authors on request. 
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 with a standard deviation of 13. Illinois moved from a rank of 36 in 1978 to 7 in 1993 before 
moving back to 12 in 1998. Those states with standard deviations above 10, indicating 
significant movement within the rankings, include Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. 
 Figure 2 explores similar issues from a different perspective. In the map, the shading of 
states reflects the average top-5 concentration of assets over the 1976 to 1998 sample period. The 
map also reports the actual average top-5 concentration in assets. For example, California’s top-5 
concentration in assets equals 65.1 percent, within the second from the highest concentration 
shading on the map. In addition, the two columns associated with each state report the top-5 
concentration in assets in 1976 and 1998 – the beginning and end of our sample period. 
Continuing our example, California’s concentration ratio falls between 1976 and 1998. Several 
observations emerge. First, the far Western states are the most concentrated and the states in the 
upper-middle of the country, the least concentrated, on average. Second, concentration between 
1976 and 1998 has generally increased in every state except many of those in the far West. 
 
 
Deregulation and Bank Concentration 
We now consider how deregulation affected bank concentration using the same set of 
independent variables – to capture changes in intrastate (bch/bn) and interstate (dr, dnr, and dnn) 
branching and banking regulation and to capture changes n the state’s economy (unem) – in 
fixed- and random-effects regressions. Two concentration measures (discussed above) are the 
percentage of state bank assets held by the top five (top5) and top ten (top10) banks in each state. 
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 The third concentration measure (not discussed above) is the Herfindahl index of bank assets in 
each state. 
 Table 7 reports the fixed- and random-effects results on bank concentration and 
deregulation. First, more permissive intrastate branching and banking regulation associates 
significantly with higher concentration across all three concentration measures. Second, more 
permissive interstate branching and banking regulation also significantly associates with higher 
concentration. The unemployment rate does not exhibit significant effects, although the sign is 
consistently negative such that a good economy associates with higher concentration. Thus, the 
deregulation of interstate and intrastate banking and branching correlates with higher 
concentration within a state.21 
V. The Location of Megabanks 
 This section examines the geographic distribution of megabanks, defined as the top 100 
banks by asset size. Table 8 reports the location of the top-5, -10, -20, -50, and -100 banks by 
state in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998, where we sort the states by average real gross state 
product (GSP) over the sample period. We observe that more mega-banks are located in states 
ranking high in average real GSP than in states with a lower average real GSP. But that 
association is less than perfect. California, for example, has the highest average real GSP, but 
falls far behind New York in the number of mega-banks within its borders. 
 New York and California split the top five banks – 4 in New York and 1 in California – 
in the first four years; then in 1998, North Carolina enters the picture with 2 top-5 banks, 
drawing New York down from 4 to 2. Moving to the top-10 banks boosts the numbers in New 
                                                 
21 Jeon and Miller (2001b) consider the correlation between bank concentration on a state-by-state basis and average 
bank profitability within a state, finding strong support for a positive correlation. They also test for temporal 
causality, finding that bank concentration leads bank profitability. 
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 York and California with Illinois capturing up to 2. The top-20 list solidifies the position of New 
York, California, and Illinois. Now, however, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania appear as 
permanent players. California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington all have banks in the top 50 each year in Table 5. For the 
top-100 banks, we add Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, and Virginia to that list. 
 Table 9 locates the top-50 banks by city grouped by states, where we, once again, sort 
states by average real GSP. Boston, Buffalo, Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, New York, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Winston-Salem are cities with a top-50 bank for each year in our sample. 
Boston, Chicago, Dallas, New York, and San Francisco all are home to Federal Reserve Banks. 
Further, Buffalo, Charlotte, Detroit, and Seattle are home to Federal Reserve Branches. Thus, 
only Winston-Salem is not home to a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch. Federal Reserve Bank 
cities were the home to about 30 top-50 banks while the Federal Reserve Branch cities were the 
home to just over 10 top-50 banks. 
 Viewed differently, only the home of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City does not 
have a top-50 bank in any year during the sample period. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
Branch cities without a top-50 bank are enumerated in the note to Table 9. Finally, we also note 
that Los Angeles does not have a bank in the top 50 since 1995.22 
 Examining the number of large banks by state and city prompts questions about 
unexpected outcomes, for example, the absence of top-50 banks in Los Angeles. Banks provide 
services to an economy that probably depends on the number of people and/or their income. To 
gain some insight here, we use each state’s percentage of nominal U.S. gross domestic product to 
 17
 allocate the top-100 banks. Those are then compared to the actual allocation of top-100 banks 
across the states. While crude, it does provide an evaluation of the existing distribution that has 
an economic basis. 
 We first distribute the number of top-100 banks where each state gets its share of the top-
100 banks based on its share of nominal gross domestic product. We then compare those results 
to the actual location of top 100 banks by state. Furthermore, we distribute all commercial banks, 
not just the top 100, across states based on each state’s share of the sum of all state’s nominal 
gross state product. We then compare this benchmark to the actual number of banks by state. 
Table 10 provides the means across the sample period for the actual and benchmark number of 
banks in each state out of the top-100 and all banks.23 Once again, we sort states by average real 
GSP over the sample period. 
 Several interesting observations emerge. First, California, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas have actual top-100 banks that differ by 3 or more from their respective benchmarks. New 
York has 22 and Pennsylvania has 3 more top-100 banks than their benchmark while California 
has 6 and Texas has 3 fewer top-100 banks than their benchmark. Second, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington all have at least twice 
as many benchmark total banks as actual banks, suggesting that they are under banked. But, of 
course, the major part of the explanation is that these states are all statewide branching states. 
Similarly, Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all have twice as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 A similar table for the top 100 banks is not provided as the number of cities is inordinately long.  
23 Tables for the benchmark location of the top-100 banks, and the benchmark and actual location for all banks by 
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 many actual total banks as benchmark banks, suggesting that these states are over banked. But, 
once again, these states except South Dakota24 have unit or limited branching. 
VI. Entry and Exit of Banks 
As noted in Section II, the fall in the actual number of banks hides significant events on the 
number of entries and exits to the industry. Exits from the industry may occur because of 
mergers, charter conversions, or relocations across state lines; entries may occur because of de 
novo entries, charter conversions, or relocations across state lines. 
 Our data on exits and entries compare bank identification numbers between two adjacent 
years and divide banks into three categories – banks in the first year and not in the second 
(exits), banks in the second year but not in the first (entries), and banks in both years (survivors). 
Focusing on the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the total number of banks fell from 
14,842 in 1976 to 9,653 in 1998. That decrease of 5,389 banks was accomplished with 11,921 
exits and 6,532 entries.  
 Table 11 reports the average number of entries, exits, and net entries (entries minus exits) 
by state for 1977 to 1979, 1980 to 1984, 1985 to 1989, 1990 to 1994, and 1995 to 1998. We now 
sort states by the average number of banks over the sample period. Several observations emerge. 
First, the quantity of new entries achieves its highest levels between 1980 and 1984 where new 
entries averaged 446 per year. A number of states average over 20 new banks per year from 1977 
through 1998 – California, Florida, New York, and Texas. Texas has the highest average of over 
40 new banks per year followed by California of over 32 banks per year. 25 If we consider the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
state are available from the authors. 
24 While South Dakota is classified as a statewide branching state, Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994, Table 5, p. 
888) classify it as limited since each bank had an average of only 1.5 branches. 
25 Once again, the Tables for the number of entries, exits, net entries, as well as the percentages of total banks are 
available from the authors. 
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 number of new entries as a fraction of the number of banks in the state, then the states with the 
highest fractions include Arizona, California, Delaware, Nevada, North Carolina, and Oregon. 
Arizona leads the list with new entries each year at 10 percent of existing banks; Nevada and 
Delaware follow with 9 percent and 8 percent, respectively.  
 The pattern for exits paints a different picture. The data suggest a regime change between 
1983 and 1984. Before 1984, the number of exits averages just fewer than 260 while after 1983 it 
averages almost 675. For exits, several states average over 20 per year – California, Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Texas. Texas has the highest number of exits per year 
at over 63 followed by Florida at over 42 per year. Relative to the number of banks in a state, 
Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have the 
highest percentage of exits per year. Florida and Rhode Island lead the pack with 9 percent exits 
per year followed by New Hampshire with 8 percent per year. 
 The pattern for net entries (i.e., entries minus exits) mirrors the pattern uncovered for the 
exits. That is, a regime change seems to have occurred between 1983 and 1984. Prior to 1984, 
net entries average plus 101 while after 1983 they average minus 406. That is, net entries are 
positive between 1977 and 1983 and negative (with the exception of 1985) between 1984 and 
1998. Several states have positive net entries over the whole sample period – Arizona, 
California, Delaware, Hawaii, North Carolina, Nevada, and New York. Several other states 
experience net entries of minus 300 or lower – Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Texas. Once 
again, some states make these lists because of the large number of banks in the state. Based on 
net entries as a fraction of total banks in a state, the states with the highest percentage of net 
entries are Nevada at 5 percent followed by Delaware at 3 percent. New Hampshire has the 
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 distinction of the lowest percentage of net entries (highest percentage of net exits) at minus 6 
percent followed by Rhode Island at minus 5 percent.  
 Figure 3 provides a visual impression of the patterns of net entry. The shading in the map 
reflects the average net entry over the entire 1977 to 1998 period. The actual average net entries 
also appear in each state under the state abbreviation. Moreover, the two columns report the 
average net entry over the two subperiods noted above – 1977 to 1983 and 1984 to 1998 – 
reflecting the observation that a regime change in exits and net entries occurred between 1983 
and 1984. Several observations emerge. First, the far Western states experienced the highest net 
entry, on average. When net entry was positive, however, it means that the net entry between 
1977 and 1983 more than offset the net exit between 1984 and 1998. Second, the upper-
Midwestern states saw the most net exit, on average. Third, generally states East of the 
Mississippi experienced net exits, on average, both before 1984 and after 1983 while those states 
West of the Mississippi river experienced net entries before 1984 and net exits after 1983. 
 In sum, we find that those states with a large number of banks generally experience a 
large number of entries, exits, and net entries. Using fractions of banks in a state, the results 
suggest that those areas with growing population and booming economies (e.g., Arizona and 
North Carolina) experience larger percentages of entries of banks while those states with slow 
population growth and stagnant economies (e.g., Rhode Island and New Hampshire) experience 
larger percentages of exits.26 
Deregulation and Net Entry Activity 
Once again, we use the same set of independent variables on intrastate and interstate branching 
and banking regulation and the state of the state’s economy in fixed- and random-effects 
                                                 
26 Jeon and Miller (2001a) examine entries, exits, and mergers in U.S. banking from 1976 to 1998 on a state-by-
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 regressions of the number of net entries to the total number of banks (nent) in a state. Table 12 
reports the findings. First, the intrastate branching and banking variable does not significantly 
affect the net entry rate and switches sign between the fixed- and random-effects specifications. 
Second, all interstate branching and banking regulatory dummy variables are significant. More 
permissive interstate branching and banking regulation associates with a lower rate of net entries 
– which could reflect fewer entries or more exits. Finally, a stronger state economy – a lower 
unemployment rate – associates significantly with a higher rate of net entries. If one interprets 
higher net entry rates as signaling more competitive banking, then deregulation (and a weaker 
state economy) leads to less competition. 
VII. Conclusion 
In the early 1980s, the U.S. banking industry began an unprecedented regulatory and structural 
change from a dual banking system with banks chartered at the state and the national levels, but 
prohibited from operating across state lines even for those banks with national charters. Several 
regulatory and legislative decisions opened the door to across-state banking operations, first by 
bank holding companies and most recently by banks themselves. The Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted banks to acquire banks in other states. 
 We examine the changes in the structure of the banking industry using the Report on 
Condition and Income (Call Report) and merger data recently posted on web by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago. Several general conclusions follow from our analysis. First, 
consolidation in the banking industry has begun and the pace of consolidation has increased in 
recent years. That pace, however, seems slower than expected, reflecting the larger than 
anticipated number of new entries. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
state using FDIC data. 
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  Second, the major part of consolidation within the banking industry, with some notable 
exceptions, has been within states and not between states. Even after the recent passage of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, still about 70 percent of the merger 
activity between banks occurs within states. Of course, as the consolidation process continues, 
eventually the opportunities for intrastate mergers will exhaust themselves and by necessity the 
action will shift to the interstate level. Some few individual bank organizations, prompted 
probably by the entrepreneurial instincts of their chief executive officers, have already pursued 
an aggressive strategy of interstate mergers and acquisitions. Those few banks have made major 
movements up in the rankings of largest banks based on total assets. 
 Interestingly, fixed- and random-effects regressions that explain the rate of merger 
activity within a state show that the merger rate increases with more permissive interstate 
branching and banking regulation. The merger rate does not respond significantly to our measure 
of intrastate branching and banking regulation.27 So even though most merger activity remains 
within state boundaries, the rate of merger activity is affected by the permissiveness of interstate 
branching and banking regulation. Those findings may suggest that banks merge within a state in 
an attempt to reduce the possibility of a takeover (merger) by an out-of-state bank. 
 Third, some groups raise concerns about the potential concentration of power amongst a 
few megabanks. The facts belie this concern to some extent. For example, the percent of total 
bank assets controlled by the top-5, -10, -20, -50, and -100 banks in the U.S. declined from 1976 
through about 1990, depending on the top-bank category considered. Their share of total assets 
has risen in recent years, but that movement does not yet seem like a serious issue. 
                                                 
27 We also experimented with the traditional dummy variables for unit, limited, and state-wide branching and 
banking regulation, using the same specification as in Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994, Table 5, p. 888), finding 
the same results as for our continuous measure (bch/bn). 
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  Such concerns about concentration of power generate a bit more support at the state 
level. The top-5 bank concentration ratio averages about 45 percent until 1983 and then rises 
gradually to 62 percent in 1998. And the average top-10 concentration ratio averages about 56 
percent until 1983, then rises to 71 percent in 1998. At what point, however, do increases in 
concentration become relevant for policy makers. 
 Still on this point, the concerns about concentration of power at the state level gain more 
credence in our fixed- and random-effects regressions. Here, both more permissive intrastate and 
interstate branching and banking regulation associates significantly with higher concentration.28 
Thus, the recent deregulation associates with higher concentration. 
 Fourth, another concern of some analysts is the availability of credit to small- and 
medium-sized firms. Those firms, by and large, do not have access to other sources of credit. 
Moreover, smaller community banks are major players in the extension of credit to small- and 
medium-sized firms. The large and frequent entry of new banks provides some comfort that 
smaller community banks are not an endangered species. Nonetheless, as the share of bank assets 
held by smaller community banks falls, reasonable concerns emerge about the availability of 
credit to small- and medium-sized firms. 
 Finally, clear evidence exists that the deregulation begun in the early 1980s began to 
have an effect on the relationship between entries and exits to the banking industry. Net entries 
were positive through 1983. From 1984 onward, net entries have been negative. That is, the 
banking industry has been contracting. The overall decline in over 5,000 banks between 1976 
                                                 
28 As noted above, Jeon and Miller (2001b) demonstrate that higher concentration in banking at the state level 
associates significantly with higher profitability. Moreover, simple temporal (Granger) causality tests imply that the 
timing is one-way from concentration to profitability. 
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 and 1998 hides the fact that the decline occurred because of over 11,000 exits and over 6,000 
entrances. 
 Moreover, our fixed- and random-effects regressions indicate that more permissive 
interstate branching and banking regulation associates significantly with a lower rate of net 
entry, even allowing for differences in the state of the state’s economy. And, as we noted above, 
the more permissive interstate branching and banking regulation also associates with a higher 
merger rate. 
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 Table 1: Commercial Bank Mergers: 1976-1998 
Commercial Banks 
Merger Mergers 
between 
Different 
States 
Total  
Number 
of banks 
 
Year 
Charter 
Disconti
nued 
Involving 
Government 
Assistance 
Other Total   
1976 121 16 0 137 1 15,264 
1977 152 6 0 158 0 15,294 
1978 166 6 0 172 0 15,418 
1979 220 8 0 228 0 15,417 
1980 130 6 0 136 1 15,849 
1981 206 8 0 214 0 15,856 
1982 272 25 0 297 1 16,062 
1983 320 38 0 358 0 16,095 
1984 346 74 1 421 3 15,657 
1985 347 94 0 441 0 15,659 
1986 343 118 1 462 1 15,340 
1987 563 175 0 738 5 14,846 
 1988 620 198 0 818 7 14,280 
1989 422 200 1 623 4 13,887 
1990 394 251 2 647 17 13,518 
1991 435 176 2 613 20 13,094 
1992 471 144 3 618 18 12,689 
1993 569 61 3 633 17 12,238 
1994 614 68 9 691 15 11,698 
1995 678 9 7 694 41 11,153 
1996 612 5 13 630 64 10,803 
1997 674 2 4 680 206 10,268 
1998 638 3 5 646 193 9,839 
Total 9,313 1,691 51 11,055 614  
Note: Data include mutual savings banks, commercial banks, and non-deposit 
trust companies. including both state and national charters. The data are 
posted at http://www.frbchi.org/rcri/rcri_database.html  
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 Table 2: Survivor and Non-Survivor Entity Types: 1976-1998 
Entity Type for Survivor  
MSB NAT STM NON MTC TRC 
Total 
MSB 270 211 81 214 0 0 776 
NAT 19 2743 312 858 1 1 3934 
STM 6 378 293 245 0 0 922 
NON 55 2073 501 2648 0 0 5277 
MTC 6 37 1 1 8 0 53 
 
Entity Type 
for 
Non-
Survivor 
TRC 0 43 10 17 6 17 93 
Total 356 5485 1198 3983 15 18 11055 
Note:  See Table 1. The entity types are defined as follows: MSB: mutual saving 
banks and federal savings bank; NAT: national bank; STM: state member 
bank; NON: non-member bank; MTC: member, non-deposit trust company; 
and TRC: non-member, non-deposit trust company. 
 
Table 3: Mergers Within and Between States: 1976-1998 (Ranked by the 
Average Number of Banks) 
Between-State  
Merger 
Between-State 
Merger 
 
 
State 
 
Within 
State 
Merger 
Survivor 
in Other 
State 
Survivor 
in 
State 
 
 
State 
 
Within
State 
Merger
Survivor 
in Other 
State 
Survivor 
in 
State 
Texas 1,370 20 4 North Dakota 80 5 13 
Illinois 655 41 17 New Jersey 207 20 12 
Minnesota 317 7 17 Montana 106 0 0 
Missouri 420 38 26 Mississippi 116 10 12 
Iowa 275 29 6 South Dakota 80 5 3 
Kansas 266 18 8 Washington 90 11 3 
Wisconsin 357 4 4 Connecticut 69 7 1 
New York 202 24 26 Maryland 88 19 12 
Florida 901 53 16 North Carolina 124 4 95 
California 374 17 42 New Mexico 46 17 2 
Oklahoma 275 3 0 Wyoming 70 3 0 
Georgia 299 27 6 South Carolina 69 10 1 
Nebraska 217 2 18 New Hampshire 46 4 0 
Colorado 407 11 3 Oregon 71 6 17 
Ohio 368 8 59 Utah 73 12 5 
Pennsylvania 265 12 18 Maine 33 1 1 
Indiana 272 20 6 Delaware 16 14 7 
Kentucky 153 15 5 Arizona 47 5 3 
Michigan 263 18 19 Vermont 16 1 0 
Tennessee 244 12 33 Idaho 17 8 0 
Massachusetts 157 0 7 Dis. Columbia 10 9 5 
Arkansas 85 39 1 Hawaii 10 2 0 
Alabama 238 11 92 Rhode Island 12 4 3 
Louisiana 200 10 6 Nevada 9 6 3 
Virginia 285 22 14 Alaska 12 2 0 
West Virginia 184 6 4     
Note: See Table 1.  
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 Table 4: Bank Mergers and Deregulation 
 
Fixed-Effects 
Models 
Random-Effects 
Models 
constant 0.0138 
(1.63) 
0.0112
(1.62)
bch/bn 0.0004 
(0.68) 
0.0008**
(2.28)
dr 0.0168* 
(3.75) 
0.0195*
(4.54)
dnr 0.0447* 
(9.08) 
0.0421*
(9.94)
dnn 0.0288* 
(5.68) 
0.0261
(5.50)
unem 0.0011 
(1.15) 
0.0012
(1.49)
R2: Within 0.1284 
 
0.1273
R2: Between 0.0610 
 
0.1046
R2: Overall 0.1163 
 
0.1218
Note: The dependent variable is the number of mergers per bank in 
each state. The independent variables include the number of 
branches per bank (bch/bn), a dummy variable for states that 
enacted legislation that allows out-of-state bank holding 
companies from a proscribed region to operate within its 
boundaries – either with or without reciprocity from the home 
state of that bank holding company (dr), a dummy variable for 
states that enacted legislation that allows out-of-state bank 
holding companies irrespective of their headquarters’ 
locations to operate within its boundaries, but only if the states 
where their headquarters are located have similar (reciprocal) 
legislation (dnr), a dummy variable for states that enacted 
legislation that allow out-of-state bank holding companies 
irrespective of their headquarters’ locations to operate within 
their boundaries without any requirement for reciprocity from 
the other states (dnn), and the unemployment rate (unem). 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
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 Table 5: Top Bank Fractional Holding of Total Assets 
Year Top-5 Banks Top-10 Banks Top-20 Banks Top-50 Banks Top-100 Banks
1976 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.47 
1977 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.47 
1978 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.48 
1979 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.49 
1980 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.47 
1981 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.39 0.47 
1982 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.46 
1983 0.15 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.45 
1984 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.45 
1985 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.36 0.44 
1986 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.44 
1987 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.44 
1988 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.34 0.44 
1989 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.44 
1990 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.43 
1991 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.43 
1992 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.34 0.44 
1993 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.46 
1994 0.14 0.19 0.26 0.37 0.48 
1995 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.38 0.49 
1996 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.42 0.53 
1997 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.49 0.60 
1998 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.51 0.62 
Note: See Table 1. The columns report the percentage of total bank assets in each year held by the top-5, 
-10, -20, -50, -100 banks based on assets.  
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 Table 6: States Ranked by Top-5 Bank Concentration of Assets (Lowest to Highest) 
Rank 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 
1 Florida Iowa Kansas Arkansas Arkansas 
2 Iowa Kansas Iowa Iowa Florida 
3 Kansas West Virginia Arkansas Kansas Kansas 
4 West Virginia North Dakota Montana Wisconsin Iowa 
5 Arkansas Montana West Virginia West Virginia Nebraska 
6 Montana Arkansas Wyoming Oklahoma Oklahoma 
7 New Jersey Wisconsin Oklahoma Illinois Texas 
8 Wisconsin Nebraska Wisconsin North Dakota Wisconsin 
9 North Dakota Wyoming Indiana Missouri West Virginia 
10 Louisiana Louisiana Missouri Colorado Kentucky 
11 Indiana Florida New Hampshire Nebraska North Dakota 
12 New Hampshire Indiana Nebraska Florida Illinois 
13 Nebraska New Jersey Colorado Kentucky Georgia 
14 Wyoming New Hampshire North Dakota Indiana Colorado 
15 Ohio Missouri New Jersey Montana New York 
16 Texas Oklahoma Texas New York Missouri 
17 Missouri Texas Florida Ohio Montana 
18 Oklahoma Tennessee Ohio New Jersey Indiana 
19 Tennessee Ohio New York Louisiana New Mexico 
20 Alabama Kentucky Kentucky New Mexico Mississippi 
21 Maine Colorado Illinois Delaware Idaho 
22 Kentucky New Mexico Tennessee Texas Maine 
23 Massachusetts Mississippi Pennsylvania Wyoming Maryland 
24 Colorado Maine New Mexico Tennessee Virginia 
25 Minnesota Massachusetts Louisiana Pennsylvania Pennsylvania 
26 Mississippi Pennsylvania Connecticut Massachusetts New Jersey 
27 South Dakota Michigan Massachusetts Georgia South Carolina 
28 Connecticut Minnesota Delaware Minnesota Vermont 
29 New Mexico Alabama Minnesota Connecticut Ohio 
30 Pennsylvania Delaware Georgia Mississippi Massachusetts 
31 Virginia New York Vermont Vermont Wyoming 
32 Michigan Connecticut Michigan Maryland California 
33 Georgia Georgia Mississippi California Delaware 
34 New York Illinois Maryland New Hampshire South Dakota 
35 Vermont Vermont California Alabama Oregon 
36 Illinois Virginia Alabama Michigan Louisiana 
37 Maryland Maryland Virginia Maine Washington 
38 South Carolina South Dakota Maine South Dakota Michigan 
39 Washington California Washington Washington Tennessee 
40 North Carolina Washington Utah Virginia Connecticut 
41 Alaska Alaska South Carolina South Carolina Minnesota 
42 Utah South Carolina Oregon North Carolina Nevada 
43 Delaware Utah South Dakota Utah New Hampshire 
44 Oregon Oregon North Carolina Oregon Utah 
45 Rhode Island North Carolina Rhode Island Arizona Arizona 
46 California Rhode Island D. Columbia D. Columbia Alabama 
47 Idaho Idaho Idaho Idaho D. Columbia 
48 D. Columbia D. Columbia Hawaii Nevada North Carolina 
49 Hawaii Hawaii Alaska Hawaii Alaska 
50 Nevada Arizona Arizona Rhode Island Hawaii 
51 Arizona Nevada Nevada Alaska Rhode Island 
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 Table 7: Bank Concentration and Deregulation 
 
Fixed-Effects  
Models 
Random-Effects  
Models 
 
top5 
 
top10 
 
hhi 
 
top5 
 
top10 
 
hhi 
 
constant 0.3949* 
(28.92) 
0.5112*
(42.03)
0.0475*
(6.90)
0.3887*
(15.72)
0.5043*
(21.13)
0.0470* 
(4.24) 
bch/bn 0.0135* 
(12.60) 
0.0115*
(12.10)
0.0070*
(13.03)
0.0143*
(13.93)
0.0124*
(13.47)
0.0071* 
(14.02) 
dr 0.0314* 
(4.36) 
0.0372*
(5.80)
0.0019
(0.51)
0.0306*
(4.24)
0.0363*
(5.62)
0.0015 
(0.42) 
dnr 0.0661* 
(8.36) 
0.0704*
(9.99)
0.0167*
(4.18)
0.0641*
(8.17)
0.0679*
(9.65)
0.0167* 
(4.25) 
dnn 0.0315* 
(3.86) 
0.0423*
(5.82)
-0.0014
(-0.34)
0.0300*
(3.68)
0.0408*
(5.59)
-0.0017 
(-0.41) 
unem -0.0023 
(-1.50) 
-0.0028**
(-2.00)
-0.0009
(-1.19)
-0.0021
(-1.37)
-0.0026
(-1.85)
-0.0009 
(-1.18) 
R2: Within 
 
0.3687 
 
0.4034 0.2841 0.3685 0.4031 0.2841 
 
R2: Between 
 
0.5023 
 
0.5453 0.3825 0.5002 0.5420 0.3827 
 
R2: Overall 
 
0.4582 
 
0.4794 0.3599 0.4598 0.4841 0.3601 
 
Note: The dependent variables include the percentage of assets in each state held by the top-
five and top-ten banks (top5 and top10), and the Herfindahl index of bank assets in each 
state. See Table 4 for the definitions of the independent variables. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
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 Table 8: Location of Top Banks by State (Ranked by Average Real GSP) 
 top 5 banks top 10 banks top 20 banks top 50 banks top 100 banks 
State            year 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98
California 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 6 6 5 4 3 9 9 8 4 3 
New York 4 4 4 4 2 6 6 6 6 4 9 9 11 9 7 17 19 21 20 14 31 31 31 30 33
Texas                 1     1 1 1   4 4 2 3 2 5 6 5 4 2 
Illinois           2 2 1   1 2 2 2 1 1 4 4 2 3 3 5 4 4 6 8 
Florida                           1     1 1 2   1 2 4 2   
Pennsylvania                 1   2 2 1 2 2 6 4 5 3 2 10 8 8 6 3 
Ohio                             1 1 1   1 4 3 4 3 3 6 
New Jersey                                   1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Michigan                     1     2   3 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 
Georgia                               1 1 1 1   2 2 2 4 1 
North Carolina         2         2       1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 
Massachusetts                     1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 5 5 2 
Virginia                                 1 1   1 2 3 3 5 1 
Washington                               2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 
Indiana                                         2     1 1 
Missouri                                       1 2 1   1 1 
Maryland                                         1 1 1 1 1 
Wisconsin                                         1 1       
Minnesota                             1   1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
Tennessee                                       1       1 3 
Connecticut                                   1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 
Colorado                                                 1 
Arizona                               1 1       2 2 2 2 1 
Louisiana                                                 2 
Alabama                                       2   1 1 1 5 
Kentucky                                                 1 
Oregon                               2         2 2 1 1   
South Carolina                                               1   
Utah                                                 2 
Dis. Columbia                                         2 2 1     
Hawaii                                             1 1 1 
Delaware                                       2     3 3 4 
Rhode Island                   1         1         1 1 1 1 1 1 
South Dakota                                   1       1 1 1 1 
Note: See Table 5. Several states do not have any top-ranked banks: Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming. Also, Puerto Rico has a top-100 bank 
in several years. 
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 Table 9: Location of Top-50 Banks by City 
State City Name 
FRB 
City 78 88 93 98 State City Name 
FRB 
City 78 83 88 93 9883 
California Los Angeles Branch 3 3 2 1   New Jersey Jersey City           1
California San Francisco Bank 3 3 3 3 3 New Jersey Newark       1 1   
New York Albany         1   Michigan Detroit Branch 3 1 1 2 2
New York Brooklyn   1 2       Georgia Atlanta Bank 1 1 1 1   
New York Buffalo Branch 1 2 2 1 1 Georgia Augusta             
New York Jamaica   1         North Carolina Charlotte Branch 1 2 2 2 2
New York New York Bank 14 15 19 18 13 North Carolina Winston-Salem   1 1 1 1 2
Texas Dallas Bank 2 2 1 2 1 Massachusetts Boston Bank 1 1 3 3 2
Texas Houston Branch 2 2 1 1 1 Massachusetts Springfield             
Illinois Chicago Bank 4 4 2 3 3 Virginia Richmond Bank   1 1   1
Florida Jacksonville Branch       1   Virginia Vienna             
Florida Miami Branch   1 1     Washington Seattle Branch 2 2 1 1 1
Florida Tampa         1   Missouri Saint Louis Bank         1
Pennsylvania Jeannette   1 1       Maryland Baltimore Branch           
Pennsylvania Ardmore   2 1 1     Maryland Bethesda             
Pennsylvania Avondale             Maryland Elkton             
Pennsylvania Bala-Cynwyd   2         Minnesota Minneapolis Bank   1 1 2 2
Pennsylvania Greensburg     1 1 1   Tennessee Memphis Branch         1
Pennsylvania Horsham Twp     1       Connecticut Hartford       1 1   
Pennsylvania Malvern       1     Connecticut Stamford           1
Pennsylvania Philadelphia Bank     1 1   Arizona Phoenix   1 1       
Pennsylvania Pittsburgh Branch 1   1 1 2 Alabama Birmingham Branch         2
Pennsylvania Rosemont             Oregon Portland Branch 2         
Ohio Cleveland Bank 1     1 2 Delaware Wilmington           2
Ohio Columbus     1     2 Rhode Island Providence           1
New Jersey Hackensack           1 South Dakota Sioux Falls       1     
Note:  See Table 5. Cities that do not have top-50 banks in years 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998 
have some top-50 banks in other years between 1978 and 1998. Other Federal Reserve Bank 
cities include Kansas City. Other Federal Reserve Branch cities include Cincinnati, Nashville, 
New Orleans, Little Rock, Louisville, Helena, Denver, Oklahoma City, Omaha, El Paso, San 
Antonio, and Salt Lake City 
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 Table 10: Actual and Benchmark Banks by State 
(Ranked by Average Real GSP) 
 Top 100 Banks Total Banks 
State Actual Benchmark Actual Benchmark 
California 7 13 507 1,754 
New York 31 9 522 1,195 
Texas 4 7 1,379 997 
Illinois 5 5 1,175 710 
Florida 2 4 508 577 
Pennsylvania 7 4 334 627 
Ohio 4 4 337 594 
New Jersey 2 4 151 495 
Michigan 4 4 294 509 
Georgia 3 2 413 332 
North Carolina 3 2 90 336 
Massachusetts 4 3 290 373 
Virginia 3 2 194 339 
Washington 2 2 115 269 
Indiana 1 2 328 287 
Missouri 1 2 600 270 
Maryland 1 2 101 258 
Wisconsin 0 2 531 258 
Minnesota 2 2 669 250 
Tennessee 1 2 289 238 
Connecticut 2 2 111 223 
Colorado 0 1 389 194 
Arizona 2 1 38 167 
Louisiana 0 2 243 260 
Alabama 1 1 245 180 
Kentucky 0 1 321 178 
Oregon 1 1 66 147 
South Carolina 0 1 79 153 
Iowa 0 1 584 152 
Oklahoma 0 1 444 161 
Kansas 0 1 554 134 
Arkansas 0 1 254 100 
Mississippi 0 1 142 104 
Nevada 0 1 17 70 
Utah 0 1 59 80 
Nebraska 0 1 412 87 
D. Columbia 1 1 20 98 
New Mexico 0 1 84 76 
West Virginia 0 1 188 81 
N. Hampshire 0 0 75 55 
Hawaii 1 1 18 70 
Delaware 2 0 43 46 
Idaho 0 0 23 47 
Maine 0 0 48 54 
Rhode Island 1 0 18 50 
Alaska 0 0 12 64 
South Dakota 1 0 135 34 
Montana 0 0 146 39 
Wyoming 0 0 83 40 
North Dakota 0 0 158 34 
Vermont 0 0 31 26 
USA 99 100 13,870 13,870 
Note: Actual total of top-100 banks equals 99 because of rounding. 
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 Table 11: Average Bank Entry, Exit, and Net Entry by State (Ranked by the Average 
Number of Banks) 
 Bank Entries Bank Exits Net Bank Entries 
Year 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98
Texas 26.7 100.4 33 10 14.3 1 9.8 189.8 76.6 57.5 25.7 90.6 -156.8 -66.6 -43.3 
Illinois 17 11.4 8.8 16.8 17.8 3 9.6 36.8 52.4 59.8 14 1.8 -28 -35.6 -42 
Minnesota 4 2.8 3.3 2.8 6 0.3 6.8 28.3 17.8 18.3 3.7 -4 -25 -15 -12.3 
Missouri 6.3 7.6 6 2 7.8 0.3 10.2 36.8 17.2 31 6 -2.6 -30.8 -15.2 -23.3 
Iowa 0.3 1.4 1.8 1.2 6.5 1 6.8 13.8 13 25 -0.7 -5.4 -12 -11.8 -18.5 
Kansas 1 5 2.8 1.8 2.5 0.7 2.8 15.5 24.6 18.8 0.3 2.2 -12.8 -22.8 -16.3 
Wisconsin 3.3 2.6 2.3 6.4 5.3 1.3 11.6 18.5 24.2 19 2 -9 -16.3 -17.8 -13.8 
New York 30 43.2 22 11.6 10 10.7 29.2 17.3 25.2 29.3 19.3 14 4.8 -13.6 -19.3 
Florida 13.3 41.6 37.3 9.2 14 65.3 56.2 40.5 23.4 41.3 -52 -14.6 -3.3 -14.2 -27.3 
California 24 83.8 21.8 13.8 13.8 6.3 16.8 21.5 32.8 40.5 17.7 67 0.3 -19 -26.8 
Oklahoma 7 12.6 3.8 0.2 1.5 0.3 4.2 29.8 16.2 11.8 6.7 8.4 -26 -16 -10.3 
Georgia 1.3 6 22 10 11 1.7 13.8 15.8 12.4 21.5 -0.3 -7.8 6.3 -2.4 -10.5 
Nebraska 1.7 6 1 3 2.5 0.3 3.4 16.3 11 11.8 1.3 2.6 -15.3 -8 -9.3 
Colorado 16.7 36 14.3 4.2 6 0.3 26.2 19.5 38.6 26.5 16.3 9.8 -5.3 -34.4 -20.5 
Ohio 3 2.8 3.3 8.6 6.8 28.7 20.2 10.5 10.6 16 -25.7 -17.4 -7.3 -2 -9.3 
Pennsylvania 3.7 2.2 9 12.2 5.5 6.3 11.8 12.3 15.4 18.8 -2.7 -9.6 -3.3 -3.2 -13.3 
Indiana 2.3 0.6 1 3.2 3.8 2 6.4 16.3 19.8 17.5 0.3 -5.8 -15.3 -16.6 -13.8 
Kentucky 0.7 1.6 2 3.4 6.5 0.7 3 1.5 13 12.8 0 -1.4 0.5 -9.6 -6.3 
Michigan 6.3 3.4 2.3 2.2 6.8 1.3 4.6 25.3 15.8 14.3 5 -1.2 -23 -13.6 -7.5 
Tennessee 2.7 2.8 5.3 5.4 5.5 1.3 14.6 10.5 8.8 17 1.3 -11.8 -5.3 -3.4 -11.5 
Massachusetts 3 2.6 27 1 3 2.3 29.4 11.8 19.2 10.5 0.7 -26.8 15.3 -18.2 -7.5 
Arkansas 0.7 2.2 0.8 2.4 4.8 0.3 2.4 1.8 2.4 18.3 0.3 -0.2 -1 0 -13.5 
Alabama 6.3 3.6 6.5 1.2 2.3 1.7 12.6 11.8 3.8 14.3 4.7 -9 -5.3 -2.6 -12 
Louisiana 3.7 9 3 2.8 2.5 0.7 0.8 20.5 8.2 15.5 3 8.2 -17.5 -5.4 -13 
Virginia 6.3 2.8 7 2.2 6 22.3 13.8 4.3 5.8 9 -16 -11 2.8 -3.6 -3 
West Virginia 4.3 2.8 1 0.4 2.5 0 4.4 8.3 13.6 10.8 4.3 -1.6 -7.3 -13.2 -8.3 
North Dakota 2 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 5.5 4.2 7 1.3 0.8 -5.3 -3.8 -6.3 
New Jersey 1.3 1.2 8.3 7.2 6.3 7.7 12 7.5 12 11.3 -6.3 -10.8 0.8 -4.8 -5 
Montana 2.7 1.2 1.5 0.4 2.8 0 0.6 2.3 11.4 8.5 2.7 0.6 -0.8 -11 -5.8 
Mississippi 2 0.2 0 1.2 2 2.3 6.2 5.8 3.2 6 -0.3 -6 -5.8 -2 -4 
South Dakota 0.7 0.6 2.8 0.4 1.8 1.3 3.4 5 2.2 5.8 -0.7 -2.8 -2.3 -1.8 -4 
Washington 8.3 5.4 4.8 5.6 5.8 0.7 3.8 6.8 6.2 9.3 7.7 1.6 -2 -0.6 -3.5 
Connecticut 1 0.8 7.8 0.8 2.5 3.7 5.8 3.3 8.8 8.8 -2.7 -5 4.5 -8 -6.3 
Maryland 2 2.2 5 2.2 2.5 4.3 4.2 1.3 4.8 6.3 -2.3 -2 3.8 -2.6 -3.8 
North Carolina 1 2.8 5.5 15.4 6.8 3.7 6 1.8 7.2 10.5 -2.7 -3.2 3.8 8.2 -3.8 
New Mexico 1.3 2.2 0 0.6 1.8 0 0.6 0.8 5.2 5 1.3 1.6 -0.8 -4.6 -3.3 
Wyoming 5.3 5.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 0 1 11 4 1 5.3 4.4 -10.5 -3.8 -0.3 
South Carolina 0 1 5 0.8 5.5 1.7 3.4 3.3 2 5 -1.7 -2.4 1.8 -1.2 0.5 
N. Hampshire 1.3 0.8 3.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 4.8 3.5 8.6 5 0 -4 -0.3 -7.2 -3.5 
Oregon 12.3 5.6 0.8 1.2 3 0.7 6 6 2.4 4 11.7 -0.4 -5.3 -1.2 -1 
Utah 7.7 1.8 4 1.2 3.5 4.3 5 4 3.8 1.8 3.3 -3.2 0 -2.6 1.8 
Maine 0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.3 5.2 2 0.8 1.3 -1.3 -4.8 -1.5 -0.2 -0.8 
Delaware 1.7 5 4.5 2.2 2.5 0 1.2 2.5 3.6 3.8 1.7 3.8 2 -1.4 -1.3 
Arizona 2.3 6.8 2 1.4 5.3 1.3 2.8 4.3 3.2 3 1 4 -2.3 -1.8 2.3 
Vermont 0.7 0 0.5 0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0 1.4 1 0 -0.8 0.5 -1.4 -0.3 
Idaho 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 2.3 0.3 0.6 1.3 1.6 2.8 1.3 -0.2 -1 -0.8 -0.5 
D. Columbia 0.7 1.6 1.5 0.6 0.3 0 0.2 0 2.4 2.8 0.7 1.4 1.5 -1.8 -2.5 
Hawaii 1 3.2 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.3 1 2.4 -0.3 -1.2 -1 
Rhode Island 0 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8 0 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.5 0 -0.8 -1 -1 -0.8 
Nevada 0.7 2 0.5 1.4 3.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 2 0.3 1.4 0 1 1.3 
Alaska 0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0 0 0 2.5 0 0.5 0 0.4 -2 0.4 -0.5 
USA 247 446 302 184 235 197 408 717 624 701 50 38 -415 -440 -466 
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 Table 12: Bank Net Entries and Deregulation 
 
Fixed-Effects 
Models 
Random-Effects
Models 
constant 0.0507* 
(4.26) 
0.0239*
(2.61)
bch/bn -0.0017 
(-1.84) 
0.0007
(1.61)
dr -0.0191* 
(-3.05) 
-0.0218*
(-3.66)
dnr -0.0545* 
(-7.91) 
-0.0568*
(-9.78)
dnn -0.0364* 
(-5.13) 
-0.0387*
(-5.90)
unem -0.0057* 
(-4.26) 
-0.0040*
(-3.57)
R2: Within 
 
0.1030 
 
0.0958
R2: Between 
 
0.0066 
 
0.0691
R2: Overall 
 
0.0495 
 
0.0878
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of net entries to 
total banks in each state. See table 4 for the 
definitions of the independent variables. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
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Figure1. Mergers Within and Between States: 1976 - 1998
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 Table 3o: Mergers Within and Between States: 1976-1998 
Between-State  
Merger 
Between-State 
Merger 
 
 
State 
 
Within 
State 
Merger 
Survivor 
in Other 
State 
Survivor 
in 
State 
 
 
State 
 
Within
State 
Merger
Survivor 
in Other 
State 
Survivor 
in 
State 
Alabama 238 11 92 Montana 106 0 0 
Alaska 12 2 0 Nebraska 217 2 18 
Arizona 47 5 3 Nevada 9 6 3 
Arkansas 85 39 1 New Hampshire 46 4 0 
California 374 17 42 New Jersey 207 20 12 
Colorado 407 11 3 New Mexico 46 17 2 
Connecticut 69 7 1 New York 202 24 26 
Delaware 16 14 7 North Carolina 124 4 95 
Dis. Columbia 10 9 5 North Dakota 80 5 13 
Florida 901 53 16 Ohio 368 8 59 
Georgia 299 27 6 Oklahoma 275 3 0 
Hawaii 10 2 0 Oregon 71 6 17 
Idaho 17 8 0 Pennsylvania 265 12 18 
Illinois 655 41 17 Rhode Island 12 4 3 
Indiana 272 20 6 South Carolina 69 10 1 
Iowa 275 29 6 South Dakota 80 5 3 
Kansas 266 18 8 Tennessee 244 12 33 
Kentucky 153 15 5 Texas 1,370 20 4 
Louisiana 200 10 6 Utah 73 12 5 
Maine 33 1 1 Vermont 16 1 0 
Maryland 88 19 12 Virginia 285 22 14 
Massachusetts 157 0 7 Washington 90 11 3 
Michigan 263 18 19 West Virginia 184 6 4 
Minnesota 317 7 17 Wisconsin 357 4 4 
Mississippi 116 10 12 Wyoming 70 3 0 
Missouri 420 38 26     
Note: See Table 1.  
  Table 8o: Location of Top Banks by State 
 top 5 banks top 10 banks top 20 banks top 50 banks 
State            year 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 78 83 88 93 98 78 83 88 93 98
Alabama                  2  1 1 5 
Arizona               1 1   2 2 2 2 1 
California 1 
top 100 banks 
98
  1 
  
1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 6 6 5 4 3 9 9 8 4 3 
Colorado                         1 
Connecticut                  1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 
Delaware                    2   3 3 4 
Dis. Columbia                     2 2 1   
Florida              1   1 1 2  1 2 4 2  
Georgia                1 1 1 1  2 2 2 4 1 
Hawaii                       1 1 1 
Illinois      2 2 1  1 2 2 2 1 1 4 4 2 3 3 5 4 4 6 8 
Indiana                     2   1 1 
Kentucky                         1 
Louisiana                         2 
Maryland                     1 1 1 1 1 
Massachusetts           1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 5 5 2 
Michigan           1  2  3 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 
Minnesota               1  1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 
Missouri                    1 2 1  1 1 
New Jersey                  1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
New York 4 4 4 4 2 6 6 6 6 4 9 9 11 9 7 17 19 21 20 14 31 31 31 30 33
North Carolina     2     2    1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 
Ohio               1 1 1  1 4 3 4 3 3 6 
Oregon                2     2 2 1 1  
Pennsylvania         1  2 2 1 2 2 6 4 5 3 2 10 8 8 6 3 
Rhode Island          1     1     1 1 1 1 1 1 
South Carolina                        1  
South Dakota                  1    1 1 1 1 
Tennessee                    1    1 3 
Texas         1   1 1 1  4 4 2 3 2 5 6 5 4 2 
Utah                         2 
Virginia                 1 1  1 2 3 3 5 1 
Washington                2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 
Wisconsin                     1 1    
 
Note: See Table 4. There are several states who do not have any top-ranked banks: Alaska, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming. Also, Puerto Rico has a 
top-100 bank in several years. 
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 Table 9o: Location of Top-50 Banks by City 
City Name FRB city 78 83 88 93 98 City Name FRB city 78 83 88 93 98 
Albany     1  Jeannette  1 1    
Ardmore  2 1 1   Jersey City      1 
Atlanta Bank 1 1 1 1  Los Angeles Branch 3 3 2 1  
Augusta       Malvern    1   
Avondale       Memphis Branch     1 
Bala-Cynwyd  2     Miami Branch  1 1   
Baltimore Branch      Minneapolis Bank  1 1 2 2 
Bethesda       New York Bank 14 15 19 18 13 
Birmingham Branch     2 Newark    1 1  
Boston Bank 1 1 3 3 2 Philadelphia Bank    1 1  
Brooklyn  1 2    Phoenix  1 1     
Buffalo Branch 1 2 2 1 1 Pittsburgh Branch 1  1 1 2 
Charlotte Branch 1 2 2 2 2 Portland Branch 2     
Chicago Bank 4 4 2 3 3 Providence      1 
Cleveland Bank 1    1 2 Richmond Bank  1 1   1 
Columbus   1   2 Rosemont        
Dallas Bank 2 2 1 2 1 Saint Louis Bank     1 
Detroit Branch 3 1 1 2 2 San Francisco Bank 3 3 3 3 3 
Elkton       Seattle Branch 2 2 1 1 1 
Greensburg   1 1 1  Sioux Falls    1   
Hackensack      1 Springfield       
Hartford    1 1  Stamford      1 
Horsham Twp   1    Tampa     1  
Houston Branch 2 2 1 1 1 Vienna       
Jacksonville Branch    1  Wilmington      2 
Jamaica  1     Winston-Salem  1 1 1 1 2 
Note:  See Table 4. Cities that do not have top-50 banks in years 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 
1998 have some top-50 banks in other years between 1978 and 1998. Other Federal 
Reserve Bank cities include Kansas City. Other Federal Reserve Branch cities include 
Cincinnati, Nashville, New Orleans, Little Rock, Louisville, Helena, Denver, Oklahoma 
City, Omaha, El Paso, San Antonio, and Salt Lake City 
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 Table 10o: Actual and Benchmark Banks by State 
 Top 100 Banks Total Banks 
State Actual Benchmark Actual Benchmark 
Alabama 1 1 245 180 
Alaska 0 0 12 64 
Arizona 2 1 38 167 
Arkansas 0 1 254 100 
California 7 13 507 1,754 
Colorado 0 1 389 194 
Connecticut 2 2 111 223 
Delaware 2 0 43 46 
D. Columbia 1 1 20 98 
Florida 2 4 508 577 
Georgia 3 2 413 332 
Hawaii 1 1 18 70 
Idaho 0 0 23 47 
Illinois 5 5 1,175 710 
Indiana 1 2 328 287 
Iowa 0 1 584 152 
Kansas 0 1 554 134 
Kentucky 0 1 321 178 
Louisiana 0 2 243 260 
Maine 0 0 48 54 
Maryland 1 2 101 258 
Massachusetts 4 3 290 373 
Michigan 4 4 294 509 
Minnesota 2 2 669 250 
Mississippi 0 1 142 104 
Missouri 1 2 600 270 
Montana 0 0 146 39 
Nebraska 0 1 412 87 
1 17 70 
N. Hampshire 0 0 75 55 
New Jersey 2 4 151 495 
New Mexico 0 1 84 76 
New York 31 9 522 1,195 
North Carolina 3 2 90 336 
North Dakota 0 0 158 34 
Ohio 4 4 337 594 
Oklahoma 0 1 444 161 
Oregon 1 1 66 147 
Pennsylvania 7 4 334 627 
Rhode Island 1 0 18 50 
South Carolina 0 1 79 153 
South Dakota 1 0 135 34 
Tennessee 1 2 289 238 
Texas 4 7 1,379 997 
Utah 0 1 59 80 
Vermont 0 0 31 26 
Virginia 3 2 194 339 
Washington 2 2 115 269 
West Virginia 0 1 188 81 
Wisconsin 0 2 531 258 
Wyoming 0 0 83 40 
USA 99 100 13,870 13,870 
Nevada 0 
Note: Actual total of top-100 banks equals 99 because of rounding. 
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Table 11o: Average Bank Entry, Exit, and Net Entry by State 
 Bank Entries Bank Exits Net Bank Entries 
Year 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98 77-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-98
Alabama 6.3 3.6 6.5 1.2 2.3 1.7 12.6 11.8 3.8 14.3 4.7 -9.0 -5.3 -2.6 -12.0 
Alaska 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 -2.0 0.4 -0.5 
Arizona 2.3 6.8 2.0 1.4 5.3 1.3 2.8 4.3 3.2 3.0 1.0 4.0 -2.3 -1.8 2.3 
Arkansas 0.7 2.2 0.8 2.4 4.8 0.3 2.4 1.8 2.4 18.3 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 0.0 -13.5 
California 24.0 83.8 21.8 13.8 13.8 6.3 16.8 21.5 32.8 40.5 17.7 67.0 0.3 -19.0 -26.8 
Colorado 16.7 36.0 14.3 4.2 6.0 0.3 26.2 19.5 38.6 26.5 16.3 9.8 -5.3 -34.4 -20.5 
Connecticut 1.0 0.8 7.8 0.8 2.5 3.7 5.8 3.3 8.8 8.8 -2.7 -5.0 4.5 -8.0 -6.3 
Delaware 1.7 5.0 4.5 2.2 2.5 0.0 1.2 2.5 3.6 3.8 1.7 3.8 2.0 -1.4 -1.3 
D. Columbia 0.7 1.6 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.4 2.8 0.7 1.4 1.5 -1.8 -2.5 
Florida 13.3 41.6 37.3 9.2 14.0 65.3 56.2 40.5 23.4 41.3 -52.0 -14.6 -3.3 -14.2 -27.3 
Georgia 1.3 6.0 22.0 10.0 11.0 1.7 13.8 15.8 12.4 21.5 -0.3 -7.8 6.3 -2.4 -10.5 
Hawaii 1.0 3.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.0 2.4 -0.3 -1.2 -1.0 
Idaho 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.8 2.3 0.3 0.6 1.3 1.6 2.8 1.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 
Illinois 17.0 11.4 8.8 16.8 17.8 3.0 9.6 36.8 52.4 59.8 14.0 1.8 -28.0 -35.6 -42.0 
Indiana 2.3 0.6 1.0 3.2 3.8 2.0 6.4 16.3 19.8 17.5 0.3 -5.8 -15.3 -16.6 -13.8 
Iowa 0.3 1.4 1.8 1.2 6.5 1.0 6.8 13.8 13.0 25.0 -0.7 -5.4 -12.0 -11.8 -18.5 
Kansas 1.0 5.0 2.8 1.8 2.5 0.7 2.8 15.5 24.6 18.8 0.3 2.2 -12.8 -22.8 -16.3 
Kentucky 0.7 1.6 2.0 3.4 6.5 0.7 3.0 1.5 13.0 12.8 0.0 -1.4 0.5 -9.6 -6.3 
Louisiana 3.7 9.0 3.0 2.8 2.5 0.7 0.8 20.5 8.2 15.5 3.0 8.2 -17.5 -5.4 -13.0 
Maine 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.3 5.2 2.0 0.8 1.3 -1.3 -4.8 -1.5 -0.2 -0.8 
Maryland 2.0 2.2 5.0 2.2 2.5 4.3 4.2 1.3 4.8 6.3 -2.3 -2.0 3.8 -2.6 -3.8 
Massachusetts 3.0 2.6 27.0 1.0 3.0 2.3 29.4 11.8 19.2 10.5 0.7 -26.8 15.3 -18.2 -7.5 
Michigan 6.3 3.4 2.3 2.2 6.8 1.3 4.6 25.3 15.8 14.3 5.0 -1.2 -23.0 -13.6 -7.5 
Minnesota 4.0 2.8 3.3 2.8 6.0 0.3 6.8 28.3 17.8 18.3 3.7 -4.0 -25.0 -15.0 -12.3 
Mississippi 2.0 0.2 0.0 1.2 2.0 2.3 6.2 5.8 3.2 6.0 -0.3 -6.0 -5.8 -2.0 -4.0 
Missouri 6.3 7.6 6.0 2.0 7.8 0.3 10.2 36.8 17.2 31.0 6.0 -2.6 -30.8 -15.2 -23.3 
Montana 2.7 1.2 1.5 0.4 2.8 0.0 0.6 2.3 11.4 8.5 2.7 0.6 -0.8 -11.0 -5.8 
Nebraska 1.7 6.0 1.0 3.0 2.5 0.3 3.4 16.3 11.0 11.8 1.3 2.6 -15.3 -8.0 -9.3 
Nevada 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.4 3.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 2.0 0.3 1.4 0.0 1.0 1.3 
N. Hampshire 1.3 0.8 3.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 4.8 3.5 8.6 5.0 0.0 -4.0 -0.3 -7.2 -3.5 
New Jersey 1.3 1.2 8.3 7.2 6.3 7.7 12.0 7.5 12.0 11.3 -6.3 -10.8 0.8 -4.8 -5.0 
New Mexico 1.3 2.2 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.6 0.8 5.2 5.0 1.3 1.6 -0.8 -4.6 -3.3 
New York 30.0 43.2 22.0 11.6 10.0 10.7 29.2 17.3 25.2 29.3 19.3 14.0 4.8 -13.6 -19.3 
North Carolina 1.0 2.8 5.5 15.4 6.8 3.7 6.0 1.8 7.2 10.5 -2.7 -3.2 3.8 8.2 -3.8 
North Dakota 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 5.5 4.2 7.0 1.3 0.8 -5.3 -3.8 -6.3 
Ohio 3.0 2.8 3.3 8.6 6.8 28.7 20.2 10.5 10.6 16.0 -25.7 -17.4 -7.3 -2.0 -9.3 
Oklahoma 7.0 12.6 3.8 0.2 1.5 0.3 4.2 29.8 16.2 11.8 6.7 8.4 -26.0 -16.0 -10.3 
Oregon 12.3 5.6 0.8 1.2 3.0 0.7 6.0 6.0 2.4 4.0 11.7 -0.4 -5.3 -1.2 -1.0 
Pennsylvania 3.7 2.2 9.0 12.2 5.5 6.3 11.8 12.3 15.4 18.8 -2.7 -9.6 -3.3 -3.2 -13.3 
Rhode Island 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.0 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.5 0.0 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 
South Carolina 0.0 1.0 5.0 0.8 5.5 1.7 3.4 3.3 2.0 5.0 -1.7 -2.4 1.8 -1.2 0.5 
South Dakota 0.7 0.6 2.8 0.4 1.8 1.3 3.4 5.0 2.2 5.8 -0.7 -2.8 -2.3 -1.8 -4.0 
Tennessee 2.7 2.8 5.3 5.4 5.5 1.3 14.6 10.5 8.8 17.0 1.3 -11.8 -5.3 -3.4 -11.5 
Texas 26.7 100.4 33.0 10.0 14.3 1.0 9.8 189.8 76.6 57.5 25.7 90.6 -156.8 -66.6 -43.3 
Utah 7.7 1.8 4.0 1.2 3.5 4.3 5.0 4.0 3.8 1.8 3.3 -3.2 0.0 -2.6 1.8 
Vermont 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.0 1.4 1.0 0.0 -0.8 0.5 -1.4 -0.3 
Virginia 6.3 2.8 7.0 2.2 6.0 22.3 13.8 4.3 5.8 9.0 -16.0 -11.0 2.8 -3.6 -3.0 
Washington 8.3 5.4 4.8 5.6 5.8 0.7 3.8 6.8 6.2 9.3 7.7 1.6 -2.0 -0.6 -3.5 
West Virginia 4.3 2.8 1.0 0.4 2.5 0.0 4.4 8.3 13.6 10.8 4.3 -1.6 -7.3 -13.2 -8.3 
Wisconsin 3.3 2.6 2.3 6.4 5.3 1.3 11.6 18.5 24.2 19.0 2.0 -9.0 -16.3 -17.8 -13.8 
Wyoming 5.3 5.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.0 1.0 11.0 4.0 1.0 5.3 4.4 -10.5 -3.8 -0.3 
USA 247 446 302 184 235 197 408 717 624 701 50 38 -415 -440 -466 
 
 
